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DICTA

and all defendants, in default, who are or may be in such military service, and protect their interests. Such appointment shall be made upon
application of plaintiff, but if no such application be made the Court
shall make the appointment on its own motion. Provided, however,
no such appointment shall be made if it appears from the affidavit filed
by the plaintiff that the defaulting defendant is not in such military
service. The Court may, in its discretion, allow a fee to such attorney
not to exceed $10.00, to be taxed and paid by the plaintiff as a part of
his costs. This rule shall take effect as of November I,A. D. 1940."

Intolerable
Lawrence Sullivan in his recent book, The Dead Hand of Bureaucracy, states his conviction as follows: "To checlk the crippling influence
of runaway bureaucracy is our foremost problem; and upon its solution
depends the survival of the American way of life."
(The Reader's
Digest,.October, 1940, p. 120.)
The latest manifestation of a reach for power by administrative
boards is the declaration of a system for the discipline and control of
attorneys representing private clients. A few months ago the Federal
Trade Commission promulgated a rule empowering a trial examiner
to suspend a hearing and recommend to the Commission for disbarment
from practice before it any attorney whom the examiner deemed guilty of
"disrepectful" language or conduct (vide supra, p. 165).
Now the New York State Labor Relations Board has followed suit
and issued a rule, effective September 16, 1940, empowering a trial
examiner to exclude from further participation in the proceeding any
attorney who, in the examiner's discretion, has been guilty of "contemptuous" conduct before him. In such an instance the hearing is to
be adjourned so as to afford the attorney's client opportunity to obtain
other counsel. A right of appeal to the board is granted to the aggrieved
attorney, but the determination of the board is final.
The above regulations pose the question whether a board, frequently consisting of laymen, should ever have the power to sit in
judgment on the conduct of a lawyer, a sworn officer of the courts. in
defending his client's rights. It is well known that numerous administrative commissions are appointed under statutes of a social-economic
character, often of the most controversial nature. It is well known,
moreover, that those men who administer these statutes are frequently
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imbued with a mission and zeal seldom seen on the bench of any court.
Many of the members of these boards, being laymen, have never studied
judicial procedure, and are wholly unfamiliar with the history of the
common law and of the ancient and ceaseless struggle for the protection
of individual rights.
How often in the past has an intrepid member of the bar stood
boldly for his client's rights in the face of a hostile tribunal! How often
the vigorous and brave conduct of an attorney could be classed as "disrespectful" or "contemptuous" by an administrative zealot untrained in
the law and careless of the rights of the respondent'
Many years ago in England Mr. Justice Bayley, in speaking of the
privilege of counsel to speak strongly in court, held that, "The law presumes that he acts in discharge of his duty, and in pursuance of his
instructions, and allows him this privilege, because it is for the advantage
of the administration of justice that he should have free liberty of
(Flint c:. Pihe. 4 Barn. and Cress. 478.)
speech."
Or take the instance when the great Sir Matthew Hale was threatened by Cromwell's government for his vigorous defense of the Duke of
Hamilton and Lord Capel. Hale replied that he was pleading in support
of law, was performing his duty to his clients, and was not to be daunted
by any threats.
Or consider the occasion when Lord Ellenborough rebuked Mr.
Brougham for a fervid address in behalf of his clients charged with
libel. The judge rebuked Brougham for inoculating himself with the
virus of his client's libel. But Brougham replied: "My lord, why am
I thus identified with the interests of my client? I appear here as an
English advocate, with the privileges and responsibilities of that office;
and no man shall call in question my principles in the faithful and
honest discharge of my duty."
Recall to mind the episode at the close of the Dean of St. Asaph's
libel case when Erskine, then 34, stood his ground before Mr. Justice
Buller. The judge criticized the jury's verdict holding the defendant
"guilty of publishing only." and threatened to expunge the word
Erskine turned to the jury and asked: "Is the word 'only' to
"only."
Erskine: "Then I
Juror: "Certainly."
stand part of the verdict?"
Buller, J.: "Then the verdict must be
insist it shall be recorded."
misunderstood. Let me understand the jury." Erskine: "The jury do
Buller, J.: "Sir, I will not be interrupted."
understand their verdict."
Frskine: "I stand here as an advocate for a brother citizen, and I desire
Buller, J.: "Sit down, sir,
that the word 'only' may be recorded."
rem-mber your duty, or I shall be obliged to proceed in another mannet." Erskine: "Your lordship may proceed in what manner you think
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I know my duty as well as your lordship knows yours.

not alter my conduct."

I shall

(The word "only" was duly recorded.)
Some years after the above tilt with Mr. Justice Buller, Lord
Campbell wrote what he thought of the conduct of Erskine on that
occasion. He said: "This noble stand for the independence of the bar,
would, of itself, have entitled Erskine to the statue, which the profession affectionately erected to his memory, in Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are
to admire the decency and propriety of the demeanor, during the struggle, no less than its spirited and the felicitous precision, with which he
meted out the requisite and justifiable portions of defiance. The example
has had a salutary effect, in illustrating and establishing the duties of
judge and advocate in England."
(6 Lives of the Lord Chancellors,
415.)
Finally, let us not overlook the valiant Malasherbes, faithful to
the end as defender of his king. This great Frenchman was unafraid
to face even the dread Convention howling for their monarch's head.
Malasherbes as advocate for Louis pleaded his client's hopeless cause,
and was content to go to the guillotine for performing his duty.
The long story of the struggle of the lawyer to protect his client
even in a court before a judge trained in the law would indicate the
danger today of placing like powers of discipline in the hands of laymen
appointed to administer the social-economic statutes now on the books.
Many a lawyer specializes in the law administered by one of these boards.
Is he to have his livelihood in constant jeopardy at the hands of these
men? Is he to stand craven before these commissions for fear that
some bureaucrat will think him "disrepectful?"
The situation calls for instant remedy. These rules must be
abrogated and none others like them ever issued.
The words of the famous Wisconsin lawyer, Edward G. Ryan, in
the impeachment trial of Judge Levi Hubbell, are apposite here. He
was speaking of the spirit of the bar. "Touch its independence," he
cried, "and it rebels to a man, shoulder to shoulder, standing up against
the invasion of its rights. A corrupt judge may disorganize it; but a
tyrannical court can neither bend it nor break it. The relation of a
lawyer to his client is a peculiar and important one. Life, character,
liberty, prosperity, all that is dear and sacred in life, are the trust of the
client to his lawyer. The world may assail: the world may persecute:
death and ruin may overhang: all men may desert, but the unfortunate
is ever secure in the zeal and loyalty of his advocate."
If in some rare instance a lawyer is really guilty of unprofessional
conduct before some quasi-judicial board, the remedy is not in such rules
as described above but in some bill similar to that recently prepared
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by the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association and submitted to the House of Delegates of such association
at its meeting last month in Philadelphia. That bill provides that
whenever an administrative agency believes that a member of the bar
has conducted himself in practice before it in a manner violative of
recognized standards of professional ethics or conduct, such agency may
bring the matter to the attention of the attorney general. If the attorney
general finds reasonable grounds to believe such charge is true, he is
required to file a proceeding against the member of the bar in the district
court of the district where the latter resides, for the purpose of securing
his suspension or disbarment. Such proceeding is to be conducted by the
court in the same manner as other disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys.

-N.

Y. State Bar Service Letuer.

THE LEGALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
From recent case rulings it is apparent that certain rules and regulations promulgated by administrative departments are being sanctioned as
law. The situation arises where a particular statute, or some section of
it,has received an official, departmental interpretation as to meaning or
applicability i.n connection with specific matters. Thenceforth, the construction placed upon the statute, in the form of an administrative ruling,
is entitled to the same respect as a legislative enactment, unless or until
a subsequent legislature takes affirmative action upon it.
In Bedford v. Colorado Fuel &3Iron, 102 Colo. 538, 81 P. (2d)
752, (1938) was called to determine whether sales of certain tangible
personal property were exempted under the Sales Tax Act, Ch. 230, S.L.
1937. Nearly two years before the case was decided the state treasurer
had ruled that certain specific sales were taxable under Sec. 2 (n) . In the
meantime the legislature had re-enacted the sales tax law, making no
change in the latter section. In its opinion the court said that "the legislature was presumptively aware of the construction theretofore given the
previous statutes, and was satisfied therewith." It was stated further that
''the re-enactment of the sales tax law, after rules of construction promulgated by the state treasurer had been in force for almost two years.
in effect, amounted to a legislative confirmation of those rules."
Again in First National Bank of Greeley, Colo. v.United States. 86
Fed. (2d) 938, in a contest over the effect of an administrative ruling on
requirements of capital stock tax returns, the Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that "repeated congressional revision of income tax statutes with
knowledge of treasury regulations relating to taxation of income from
sales of corporate property by liquidating receivers of trustees . ..is such

